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Good afternoon.  I am honored to have been invited to this conference, and I 
want to congratulate my colleagues at Cleveland State for putting together an 
excellent program.  
I.  RELIABILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
My panel is discussing reliable jury verdicts, and my topic is “scientific” 
evidence.  One way to approach this issue is to compare scientific evidence with 
other methods of proof.  After I graduated from law school, I served in the military 
where I tried cases as a defense counsel and later as a prosecutor.  The trial lawyers 
that I worked with viewed cases as falling primarily into one of three categories: 
eyewitness cases, confession cases, and “scientific” evidence cases.  In this scheme, 
anything that was not an eyewitness, confession, or snitch case was a “scientific 
evidence” case.2  These categories, of course, are neither exhaustive3 nor mutually 
exclusive; often two and sometimes all three are involved.  Nevertheless, these 
categories are helpful because they present trial attorneys with very different 
problems of proof.  
                                                                
1Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western 
Reserve University. 
2After the Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 
U.S. 579 (1993), perhaps the term “physical evidence” is more apt in this context.  In Daubert, 
the Court defined “scientific” evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 as evidence based 
on the “scientific” method:  “[I]n order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge, an inference or 
assertion must be derived by the scientific method.  Proposed testimony must be supported by 
appropriate validation–i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based on what is known.  In short, the requirement 
that an expert’s testimony pertain to ‘scientific knowledge’ establishes a standard of 
evidentiary reliability.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
3Cases in which accomplices or coconspirators turn “state’s evidence” and testify against 
their former colleagues would be another category. 
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The DNA exoneration cases not only establish the fact of wrongful convictions, 
they tell us something about the reliability of each of these categories.4 
A.  Eyewitness Identifications 
Commentators have noted that the wrongful convictions in the DNA exoneration 
cases were based on misidentifications eighty four percent of the time.5  But the 
pitfalls of eyewitness identifications have been known for more than seventy years, 
going back to at least the Sacco and Vanzetti trial,6 and there is substantial 
experimental research on this subject.7  However, we  have yet to implement the 
insights gained from this research.  The Warren Court recognized the problem8 and 
attempted to address it through the right to counsel9 and due process guarantees.10  
The Burger Court, however, restricted the applicability of the right to counsel11 and 
watered down the due process test.12   
                                                                
4The exoneration cases are discussed in EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, 
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH 
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996) (hereinafter CONNORS) (discussing twenty-eight cases) and 
BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER 
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (2000) (hereinafter SCHECK) (“In 1999, the 
Innocence Project reconstructed sixty-two cases in the United States of the sixty-seven 
exonerations in North America to determine what factors had been prevalent in the wrongful 
convictions ....”).  
5See SCHECK, supra note 4, at 246 (“Mistaken eye-witnesses were a factor in 84 percent of 
the convictions ....”). 
6FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30 (1927) (“What is the worth 
of identification testimony even when uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is 
proverbially untrustworthy.”).  See also EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 367 
(1932) (“Perhaps the major source of these tragic errors is an identification of the accused by 
the victim of a crime of violence.  This mistake was practically alone responsible for twenty-
nine of these [sixty-five] convictions”); HUGO MUNSTERBERG, ON THE WITNESS STAND:  
ESSAYS ON PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIME 44 (1908) (“Justice would less often miscarry if all who 
are to weigh evidence were more conscious of the treachery of human memory.”). 
7See 1 PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 9.2 (3d ed. 
1999) (discussing research). 
8See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“The vagaries of eyewitness 
identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken 
identification.”).  See also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (stating that “there is 
almost nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger 
at the defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
9See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 
(1967).  See generally 1 WAYNE LAFAVE ET AT., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7.3 (2d ed. 1999).  
10See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (holding that an “unnecessarily 
suggestive” identification procedure violated due process). 
11In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S 682, 688 (1972), the Court held that the right to counsel did 
not attach until the commencement of judicial adversary proceedings—for example, at the 
initial appearance before a magistrate.  Accordingly, an arrest by itself does not trigger the 
right to counsel.  Because many, if not most, lineups occur prior to the initiation of judicial 
proceedings, the right to counsel has not played a major role in later cases.  Moreover, the 
Court ruled in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973), that the right to counsel did not 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/12
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B.  Confessions 
The DNA exonerations also include some false confession cases.13  For example, 
David Vasquez, who was border-line mentally retarded,14 confessed to a crime which 
he did not commit.15  In fact, he pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty.  He was 
later exonerated.  By focusing on Vasquez, the police overlooked Timothy Spencer, 
a brutal serial murder-rapist who  actually committed the crime.16   
Indeed, the first forensic DNA case, which occurred in England in 1986, involved 
a false confession.17  The police were investigating two brutal killings of young 
women three years apart and obtained a confession to one of them.18  But their 
suspect, Howard,  refused to confess to the second murder.  Nevertheless, the police 
believed the second murder was so similar to the first murder that it had to have been 
committed by the same person.   They sought out Dr. Jeffreys in an attempt to tie 
Howard to the second murder through DNA analysis.  Jeffreys surprised the police 
when he concluded that both murders were committed by the same person but the 
suspect was not the assailant.  Another person later confessed to both crimes, and his 
DNA matched the crime scene evidence. 
                                                          
apply at a photographic display, even if the display was conducted after the attachment of the 
right to counsel.   
12The Stovall due process test, which focused on the identification procedure itself, was 
subsequently modified.  See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977).  The new test focuses 
on the reliability of the actual identification in the case.  Thus, an identification based on an 
unnecessarily suggestive procedure may nevertheless be admissible if found to be “reliable.”  
13See SCHECK, supra note 4, at 246 (In wrongful conviction cases, false confessions played 
a role “in 24 percent” of the cases).  Confessions are also problematic because of the way 
police conduct them; these methods raise constitutional issues. 
14See PAUL MONES, STALKING JUSTICE:  THE DRAMATIC TRUE STORY OF THE DETECTIVE 
WHO FIRST USED DNA TESTING TO CATCH A SERIAL KILLER 78-80 (1995) (Vasquez’s 
confession was based on a “dream” and his account was incoherent and inconsistent; the 
police convinced Vasquez that his fingerprints were found at the scene, and then they fed him 
the details of the crime); CONNORS, supra note 4, at 73 (discussing Vasquez case). 
15See generally Peter Brooks, Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law and 
Literature, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (1996); Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of False 
Confessions, 57 MEDICO-LEGAL J. 93 (1989) (discussing coerced-complaint confessions and 
coerced-internalized confessions); Richard A. Leo, Criminal Law:  The Impact of Miranda 
Revisited, 86 J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. L. 621 (1996); Arye Rattner, Convicted But Innocent:  
Wrongful Conviction in the Criminal Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283 (1988). 
16See MONES, supra note 14. 
17See JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLOODING (1989) (discussing the investigation and capture 
of Colin Pitchfork for the rape-murders of Lynda Mann in 1983 and Dawn Ashworth in 1986); 
NOVA, MURDER, RAPE AND DNA (1988) (films for the humanities & sciences). 
18HARLAN LEVY, AND THE BLOOD CRIED OUT: A PROSECUTOR’S SPELLBINDING ACCOUNT 
OF THE POWER OF DNA 29 (1996) (“Not only was [Howard] innocent of the first murder but he 
had falsely confessed to the rape and murder of [the second victim].”). 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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C.  Scientific-Physical Evidence  
The third type of evidence is physical/scientific evidence.  There are statements 
in some Warren Court opinions emphasizing the reliability of this type of evidence 
when compared with confessions and lineups.  For example, in Escobedo v. 
Illinois,19 the Court observed:  “We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and 
modern, that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 
‘confession’ will, in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a 
system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful 
investigation.”20  Moreover, Justice Brennan, writing in Davis v. Mississippi,21 
commented:  
Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion 
upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions.  
Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an individual’s private 
life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or search.  Nor can 
fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to harass any individual, 
since the police need only one set of each person’s prints.  Furthermore, 
fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and effective crime solving 
tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions and is not subject to 
such abuses as the improper lineup and the “third degree.”22 
Scientific evidence, as the DNA exoneration cases demonstrate, is often more 
reliable than other types of evidence; and we should be further developing our 
capabilities to use such evidence.  Scientific proof, however, raises its own problems. 
II.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
There have been several significant developments in scientific evidence in the 
last decade, all of which involve reliability concerns in one way or another.  First, the 
Daubert decision and its progeny, especially Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,23 have 
had a profound affect on scientific evidence.  In United States v. Hines,24 a district 
court wrote that Kumho “plainly invite[s] a reexamination even of ‘generally 
accepted’ venerable, technical fields.”25  As a result of its reexamination of 
                                                                
19378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
20Id. at 488-89.  See also Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (“Modern 
community living requires modern scientific methods of crime detection lest the public go 
unprotected.”). 
21394 U.S. 721 (1969). 
22Id. at 727. 
23526 U.S. 137 (1999) (holding that “Daubert’s general holding—setting forth the trial 
judge’s general ‘gatekeeping’ obligation—applies not only to testimony based on ‘scientific’ 
knowledge, but also to testimony based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”). 
2455 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999). 
25Id. at 67.  See also United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (“[T]he testimony at the Daubert hearing firmly established that forensic document 
examination, despite the existence of a certification program, professional journals and other 
trappings of science, cannot, after Daubert, be regarded as ‘scientific ... knowledge.’”).  See 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/12
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handwriting evidence, the court restricted admissibility of this well-accepted 
technique.  Other techniques such as hair comparisons26 and even fingerprint 
identification27 have been challenged.  
Second, the advent of DNA evidence has had a profound impact.  There were 
extensive battles over DNA admissibility, and some commentators at this conference 
were principals in those cases – for example,  Terry Gilbert and Jim Wooley.28  The 
DNA admissibility battles had a salutary effect.  The research scientists who testified 
as experts in the DNA cases came from a “scientific” culture, unlike the many 
forensic scientists who work in crime laboratories and are sometimes “cops in lab 
coats.”  These scientists were comfortable with quality control procedures, 
demanded written protocols, viewed proficiency testing as a positive development, 
and believed in open science and “not trial by ambush.”  Commentators began to ask 
why such procedures were not applied in other forensic fields.29 
The third development was the disclosure of the abuses in the use of scientific 
evidence.  Fred Zain was Chief Serologist for ten years in West Virginia.  In 
reviewing a judicial report on Zain’s misconduct, the West Virginia Supreme Court 
spoke of “shocking and . . . egregious violations,” “corruption of our legal system,” 
and “mock[ing] the ideal of justice under law.”30  West Virginia prosecutors, upset 
                                                          
also Andre Moenssens, Handwriting Identification Evidence In the Post-Daubert World, 66 
UMKC L. REV. 251 (1997); D. Michael Risinger et al., Brave New “Post-Daubert World”—A 
Reply to Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405 (1998).   
26See Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529, 1558 (E.D. Okl. 1995) (“This court has 
been unsuccessful in its attempts to locate any indication that expert hair comparison 
testimony meets any of the requirements of Daubert.”), rev’d, Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 
1508, 1522-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (due process, not Daubert, standard applies in habeas 
proceedings).  See also Paul C. Giannelli & Emmie West, Hair Comparison Evidence, 37 
CRIM. L. BULL. 514 (2001) (discussing the DNA exoneration cases in which hair evidence was 
used to convict the innocent).   
27See United States v. Havvard, 117 F.Supp.2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (upholding 
admissibility), aff’d, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).  See also Mark Hansen, Dusting for 
Daubert:  Several Defense Lawyers Argue Fingerprint Evidence Is Not Scientific.  So far, the 
Courts Aren’t Buying It, 86 A.B.A. 20 (2000) (“In the last year alone, more than a dozen so-
called Daubert challenges to the admissibility of fingerprint identification evidence have been 
filed in state and federal courts around the country.  In the three cases that have been decided 
so far, the courts have all admitted the fingerprint evidence.  But critics say the battle isn’t 
over yet”). 
28See United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 568 (6th Cir. 1993) (DNA).  As an aside, I can 
say that these lawyers did a great job, especially compared to their colleagues who dealt so 
poorly with “voiceprints” and hypnotically-fresh testimony.  See generally GIANNELLI, supra 
note 7, at ch. 10 (discussing “voiceprint” evidence); id. at ch. 12 (discussing hypnotically-
refreshed testimony). 
29See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, What DNA “Fingerprinting” Can Teach the 
Law About the Rest of Forensic Science, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 361, 372 (1991) (“[F]orensic 
scientists, like scientists in all other fields, should subject their claims to methodologically 
rigorous empirical tests.  The results of these tests should be published and debated.  Until 
such steps are taken, the strong claims of forensic scientists must be regarded with far more 
caution than they traditionally have been.”). 
30The report by the judge states: 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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when Zain left because they could not get the great results Zain produced, sent the 
evidence down to Zain in his new job in San Antonio.  He never failed them. 
Dr. Erdman faked autopsies for a decade in Texas.31  In one case, Erdmann ruled 
that a 16-month old child died from a blow to the stomach, a finding that led to the 
murder indictment of the child’s father.  A second autopsy, conducted by different 
pathologists, cited drowning as the cause of death, a conclusion consistent with the 
father’s version of an accidental death.  But the defense was not the only side hurt by 
Dr. Ralph’s misconduct.  He also declared that murder victims had died “due to 
natural causes.”   
The Inspector General’s 1997 report on the FBI laboratory also raised serious 
issues of laboratory negligence and misconduct.32  The investigation found 
scientifically flawed testimony, inaccurate testimony, testimony beyond the 
competence of FBI examiners, improper preparation of laboratory reports, 
insufficient documentation of test results, scientifically flawed reports, inadequate 
record management and retention, and failures of management to resolve serious and 
credible allegations of incompetence.  The report’s recommendations are revealing 
because they are so basic—and so obvious.  They include:  seeking accreditation of 
the FBI laboratory by the American Society of Crime Laboratory 
Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board; requiring examiners in the Explosives 
Unit to have scientific backgrounds in chemistry, metallurgy, or engineering; 
mandating that each examiner who performs work prepare and sign a separate report 
instead of having one report “without attribution to individual examiners”; reviewing 
analytical reports by unit chiefs; preparing adequate case files to support reports; 
monitoring court testimony in order to preclude examiners from testifying to matters 
beyond their expertise or in ways that are “unprofessional”; and developing written 
protocols for scientific procedures. 
                                                          
The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included (1) overstating the strength of 
results; (2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces of 
evidence; (3) misreporting the frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of 
evidence; (4) reporting that multiple items of evidence had been tested, when only a 
single item had been tested; (5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive; (6) 
repeatedly altering laboratory records; (7) grouping results to create the erroneous 
impression that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested; (8) failing 
to report conflicting results; (9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional 
testing to resolve conflicting results; (10) implying a match with a suspect when 
testing supported only a match with the victim; and (11) reporting scientifically 
impossible or improbable results.  
In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 508 
(W. Va. 1993) (quoting report).  See Paul C. Giannelli, The Abuse of Scientific Evidence in 
Criminal Cases:  The Need for Independent Crime Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POLICY & L. 
439 (1997). See also David Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the 
Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123 (1996) (discussing cases in Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and England). 
31See GIANNELLI, supra note 30 (discussing Erdmann). 
32U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, THE FBI LABORATORY: 
AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-
RELATED AND OTHER CASES (April 1997) [hereinafter I.G. REPORT]. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/12
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III.  SAM SHEPPARD CASE 
The Sheppard case offers some valuable lessons in the use of experts.  It also 
provides a time line, permitting us to compare the treatment of experts at each of the 
various trials.  I have spent a couple of weeks reading the Sam Shepard cases33 as 
well as books on the various trials.   
A.  Crime Scene Search 
The first thing that struck me was the crime scene search.  It was botched.34  The 
crime scene was not properly secured,  too many people had access to the house, and 
there was also an improperly protected outside crime scene.  As one commentator 
has said:  “Even the most sophisticated forensic instrumentation cannot remedy 
errors made during the identification, collection, preservation, and transportation of 
evidence from the scene to the forensic laboratory.”35  
This reminded me of the Dr. Jeffrey McDonald case.36  I was stationed at Fort 
Bragg with the 82nd Airborne Division at the time of the initial investigation of 
McDonald for the killings of his wife and his two kids.37  I remember speaking to the 
                                                                
33See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (overturing 1954 conviction due to 
prejudicial publicity); State ex rel Tubbs Jones v. Suster, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (Ohio 1998) 
(permitting wrongful imprisonment civil suit to go forward); State v. Sheppard, 135 N.E.2d 
340, 342 (Ohio 1956) (“Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were combined in this 
case in such a manner as to intrigue and captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps 
unparalled in recent annals.”).  
34See James F. McCarty, Body of Evidence, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 10, 1996, 
Sunday Magazine, at 9 (“By modern forensic standards, the police investigation was a 
disaster.  Crowds of gawkers were permitted to walk all over the crime scene.  Some evidence 
was mishandled and misinterpreted, other evidence ignored, even covered up.  A trail of blood 
led from the murder scene in the bedroom all the way to the basement, yet was dismissed by 
police as the victim’s, dripping from the murder weapon, and was never tested for blood 
type.”). 
35Bruce H. Hanley & Steven C. Clark, Developing National Guidelines for Death Scene 
Investigations, 14 CRIM. JUST. 26 (1999).  See also Mark Hansen, Body of Evidence, 81 
A.B.A. J. 60 (1995) (death investigations in U.S. are “no better than what they have in many 
Third World countries,” quoting Dr. Werner Spitz; “It’s a national disgrace,” quoting Dr. 
Michael Baden). 
36See United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982) (rejecting speedy trial claim ); 
United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1982) (affirming conviction); United 
States v. MacDonald, 640 F. Supp. 286 (D.N.C. 1985) (denying habeas relief); United States 
v. MacDonald, 607 F. Supp. 1183 (D.N.C. 1985) (denying government’s pleas for forfeiture of 
book proceeds); United States v. MacDonald, 779 F.2d 962 (4th Cir. 1985) (affirming denial 
of motion for new trial on habeas corpus).  
37See JOE MCGINNISS, FATAL VISION 96-97 (1983) (“MacDonald’s pajama bottoms, for 
example—potentially crucial evidence—had been discarded by a hospital orderly in the 
emergency room and had been burned with the rest of the hospital trash.  In addition, the MPs 
assigned to guard the exterior of 544 Castle Drive on the morning of February 17, had allowed 
the Fort Bragg trash collectors to empty the MacDonald garbage cans before any CID agent 
had thought to examine the rubbish for possible evidence—such as a bloodstained pair of 
disposable rubber surgeon’s gloves.  Such gloves, of course, could as easily have been flushed 
down the toilet.  But before this thought had occurred to agents at the scene (four days after 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2001
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Army prosecutor in that case.  One of the reasons the Army did not go forward with 
the case (although McDonald was later convicted in a federal district court) was the 
mishandling of crime scene evidence.   
If we “fast forward”  to the last decade, what have we learned?  Let me quote 
from a police chief in the post-O.J. Simpson era.  He wrote that “the handling of 
evidence until it reaches the crime lab will be as important as the laboratory 
technology procedures themselves.”38  This was clearly illustrated by the JonBenet 
Ramsey investigation, where a detective “further contaminated the crime scene by 
placing a blanket over the body and by allowing 10 people to mill throughout the 
house.”39  
Former Attorney General Janet Reno has cautioned that “[a]mong the tasks ahead 
are ... maintaining the highest standards for the collection and preservation of DNA 
evidence.”40  As a result, the Justice Department, to its credit, has published a crime 
scene investigation guide for law enforcement.41  We do a very poor job of training 
our police officers.  You can not train them at the crime scene.  They have to be 
trained ahead of time to be able to react in a professional manner to some very gory 
and bloody situations.   
B.  Challenging Expert Testimony: The Need for Pretrial Discovery 
Another striking point in the Sheppard trial was how the experts were challenged 
in these three trials.  We have a rather unusual opportunity to scrutinize the use of 
scientific evidence because we have three different trials of the same case to 
                                                          
the murders), the laboratory technicians from Fort Gordon had been making such regular use 
of the toilet facilities as to assure that evidence disposed of by such means would have been 
long since carried into the main sewer lines and lost forever.  Blunders by lab technicians had 
not stopped there.  When one, using a saw, had attempted to remove the bloody footprint from 
the floor of Kristen’s room, the boards on which the print had been made had separated and 
the print itself had been destroyed.  Even back at the laboratory, inexcusable mistakes 
continued to be made.  The piece of skin found beneath Colette’s fingernail, for instance, had 
inexplicably been lost.  And lost, too, was the vial which contained the blue fiber that had been 
scraped from beneath the fingernail of Kristen.”) 
38CONNORS, supra note 4, at xxvi (“[T]he O.J. Simpson case and other recent sensational 
trials have put law enforcement under an intensely powerful microscope, examining our most 
basic procedures for collecting, processing, and caring for evidence.”). 
39James Brooke, Bungled JonBenet Case Bursts a City’s Majesty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 
1997, at A10.  
40CONNORS, supra note 4, at iii. 
41See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATION: A GUIDE FOR LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 28 (2000) (“Evidence at crime scenes that is in the process of documentation, 
collection, preservation, or packaging should be handled with attention to scene integrity and 
protection from contamination or deleterious change.  During the processing of the scene, and 
following documentation, evidence should be appropriately packaged, labeled, and maintained 
in a secure, temporary manner until final packaging and submission to a secured evidence 
storage facility or the crime laboratory.”).  See also DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL 
GUIDELINES FOR DEATH INVESTIGATIONS 20 (1997) (“It is essential to maintain a proper chain 
of custody for evidence.  Through proper documentation, collection, and preservation, the 
integrity of the evidence can be assured.  A properly maintained chain of custody and prompt 
transfer will reduce the likelihood of a challenge to the integrity of the evidence.”). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol49/iss3/12
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compare.  At the 1954 trial, scientific evidence apparently played a significant role.  
In his book on the Sheppard case, Paul Holmes wrote: 
The prosecution got considerable benefit from the evidence of its 
scientific investigators.  The prosecutors made a production out of the 
presentation of testimony by the investigators, conveying an impression 
that this was mighty deep stuff and consequently mighty important.  The 
jurors heard a lot of scientific terms and multi-syllable names of many 
chemical compounds.  They heard defense lawyers objecting loudly to the 
drawing of conclusions about the meanings of some of the tests and saw 
them fighting tenaciously to keep some of the prosecutions’s queries from 
being answered.  In over-all effect this implied that ... [the information] ... 
must somehow be severely damaging to Sam, even if hard to follow and 
understand.42 
In particular, Dr. Gerber’s testimony about a “surgical instrument” leaving an 
impression on a pillow case made a powerful impression.  However, the defense 
failed to challenge this evidence.  As one commentator noted:   “[Defense counsel] 
Corrigan committed a crucial mistake in overlooking the susceptibility of jurymen to 
Gerber’s fanciful interpretation of blood clues.  He should have tried to find a 
specialist who could have countered Gerber’s flash of inspiration with cogent 
findings.  Even worse, the lawyer seems never to have thought that the murder room 
and its unexamined bloodstains might provide evidence valuable for the defense.”43  
Consequently, on the day of trial, “Corrigan stood empty-handed as far as scientific 
evidence went.”44 
In the second trial, F. Lee Bailey, the new defense counsel, undercut Dr. Gerber 
on cross-examination.45  Bailey had an advantage over Corrigan.  He had Gerber’s 
testimony from the first trial.46  This is a critical factor, especially in dealing with 
scientific evidence.  To this day, discovery depositions are unavailable in Ohio47 and 
                                                                
42PAUL HOLMES, THE SHEPPARD MURDER CASE 134-37 (1980) (“The prosecution’s test-
tube brigade put a lot of time, energy, and skill into testing blood spots around the house but 
ignored completely the room in which Marilyn Sheppard was murdered.”). 
43JURGEN THORWALD, CRIME AND SCIENCE: THE NEW FRONTIER IN CRIMINOLOGY 147-48 
(1966). 
44Id. at 148. 
45F. LEE BAILEY, THE DEFENSE NEVER RESTS 86-87 (1971) (“At the first trial, Dr. Gerber 
had gotten a lot of mileage out of the bloodstains on Marilyn’s pillow, testifying that in one 
bloodstain he could make out the impression of a surgical instrument.  He never specified the 
instrument, but described the imprint as being that of two three-inch blades, with indentations 
at the end of each blade as if they had teeth.”).  
46Id. at 86 (“Then there was Dr. Samuel Gerber, the state’s number one witness at the first 
trial, the white-haired coroner who has leapt into action with an inquest at the snap of a 
Cleveland Press editorial.  To put it mildly, I was waiting for Dr. Gerber.”). 
47An attorney may depose only his own witnesses for the purpose of preserving their 
testimony in anticipation of their unavailability at the time of trial.  See 2 LEW KATZ & PAUL 
GIANNELLI, BALDWINS’ OHIO PRACTICE, CRIMINAL LAW ch. 49 (1996) (discussing defense 
discovery and depositions). 
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most other jurisdictions.48  Paradoxically, discovery depositions were available for 
the latest trial because it was a civil suit. 
Paul Kirk was probably the most important expert at the second trial.49  Where 
was he at the first trial?  He was not hired until after the first verdict.  Why wasn’t he 
hired before then?  There is some indication that Corrigan did not have access to the 
house, the murder scene.  But he apparently did not vigorously pursue this issue by 
filing a motion.  He did not tell the judge, “I have an expert.  I need to get in there.”50  
In the third trial, the civil case recently completed, other experts scrutinized Paul 
Kirk’s analysis.  Kirk was one of the founding fathers of blood spatter analysis.  But 
there are questions about his conclusion that a left-handed person committed the 
crime and the existence of a possible bite mark on the assailant’s hand.51  There are 
thirty to forty reported blood-spatter cases today.  How can an attorney, in this case 
the prosecutor, deal with Paul Kirk without knowing all this ahead of time?52   I do 
not think that he or she can. 
C.  Access to Experts 
There were numerous experts at the civil trial: forensic dentists, forensic 
pathologists, forensic anthropologists, DNA analysts, and blunt instrument trauma 
experts (who attempted to determine how serious Dr. Sheppard’s injuries were).  
There were also the blood spatter experts.  Moreover, “crime scene” experts 
(profilers) were retained to determine whether the scene indicated domestic violence 
                                                                
48See GIANNELLI, supra note 7, at ch. 3 (discussing discovery of scientific evidence). 
49See Edward Imwinkelried, Forensic Science: Bloodspatter Analysis, 36 CRIM. L. BULL. 
509, 509 (2000) (“In the view of some commentators, the ‘seminal event in the history of this 
forensic science’ was an attempted use of bloodspatter analysis in the famous prosecution of 
Dr. Sam Sheppard for the murder of his wife Marilyn in Cleveland, Ohio.”); BAILEY, supra 
note 45, at 85 (“The real weakness of the defense in Sam’s first trial had been his attorneys’ 
inability to gather evidence.  This time, we had the testimony of Dr. Paul Leland Kirk, the 
criminologist who had examined Dr. Sheppard’s bedroom.”); McCarty, supra note 34, at 10 
(“In police laboratories around the world today, Kirk’s post-trial investigation of the Sheppard 
scene in 1955 is still hailed as the seminar event in the history of forensic science.”). 
50THORWALD, supra note 43, at 148 (“But Corrigan made no serious effort to procure 
access to Sheppard’s house for the defense.”).  
51Even before the civil trial, some of Kirk’s conclusions were questioned.  See THORWALD, 
supra note 43, at 153 (“This led Kirk to a further conclusion which at first seemed to verge 
dangerously upon pure speculation.  He asked himself: Could  the bloody contact spot on the 
wardrobe door have come from the murderer, who might have been trying to silence the 
struggling victim with his right hand and been bitten badly in the process?”); id. at 154 
(“Nevertheless, he was somewhat exceeding his authority when he capped this section of his 
report with the sentence: ‘These differences are considered to constitute confirmatory 
evidence that the blood on the large spot [on the door] had a different individual origin from 
most of the blood in the bedroom.’  He may have been right in his belief that this blood spot 
pointed to the presence of an unknown third person; but he was also crossing the boundary of 
certainties and exposing himself to possible attacks which could endanger the value of his 
work as whole.”). 
52See Paul C. Giannelli, Criminal Discovery, Scientific Evidence, and DNA, 44 VAND. L. 
REV. 791 (1991) (discussing the shortcomings of current discovery procedures).  
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as opposed to a sexual assault, and whether there were signs of “staging.”  This type 
of testimony is of very recent origin.53   
If this was a criminal case tried today, few defendants could afford such experts.  
The DNA expert, who provided free services in the Sheppard case, told a journalist 
that he would have charged $150,000 in an ordinary case.54  Most criminal 
defendants are indigents—as many as eighty-five percent in some jurisdictions.55  In 
Ake v. Oklahoma,56 the Supreme Court required that indigent defendants have access 
to experts, but there is some indication that Ake is not being liberally construed.57 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Because my time is running out, let me summarize my thoughts.  First, I think 
“skillful investigation” (i.e., scientific evidence) offers a better approach to crime 
detection than eyewitness identifications or confessions.  But we need to allocate 
more funds to and require stricter testing of crime laboratories, medical examiners, 
and coroner systems, which are often dangerously underfunded.   
                                                                
53E.g., Pennell v. State, 602 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (permitting expert to review three 
murders and express the opinion that they were all committed by the same person); State v. 
Code, 627 So. 2d 1373 (La. 1993) (upholding conviction for four murders, in which there 
were striking similarities including matching latent fingerprints, similar electrical cord and 
duct tape, use of a unique handcuff ligature, distinctive knots, the victims were stabbed or 
strangled multiple times, and the coroner’s reports and testimony identified the various 
signature elements of the murders; expert testified that these similarities demonstrated 
“signature crimes” of the defendant); State v. Fortin, 745 A.2d 509 (N.J. 2000) (excluding 
“linkage analysis” in an attempt to connect two different crimes).  See generally JOHN E. 
DOUGLAS ET AL., CRIME CLASSIFICATION MANUAL: A STANDARD SYSTEM FOR INVESTIGATING 
AND CLASSIFYING VIOLENT CRIMES (1992); STEPHEN G. MICHAUD & ROY HAZELWOOD, THE 
EVIL THAT MEN DO: FBI PROFILER ROY HAZLEWOOD’S JOURNEY INTO THE MINDS OF SEXUAL 
PREDATORS (1998); Donald Q. Cochran, Alabama v. Clarence Simmons: FBI “Profiler” 
Testimony to Establish an Essential Element of Capital Murder, 23 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 69 
(1999). 
54See McCarty, supra note 34, at 14 (“If Tahir were to charge his standard expert’s fee for 
outside contract work, his final bill might approach $150,000.  But for Sheppard, he made an 
exception.”). 
55YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27 (8th ed. 1994) (“The most 
complete national survey estimated the overall felony indigency rate at 48%, and statistics 
from particular urban jurisdictions suggest rates in the 70-85% range.”). 
56470 U.S. 68 (1985).  Ake’s attorney requested a psychiatric evaluation at state expense 
to prepare an insanity defense.  The trial court refused, and although insanity was the only 
contested issue at trial, no psychiatrist testified on this issue. 
57See KELLY & WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE: INSIDE THE SCANDALS AT THE FBI CRIME 
LAB 27 (1998) (“[E]xperts cost money.  The vast majority of defendants’ don’t have it....  The 
result has been what some experts have termed ‘an economic presumption of guilt.’”); 
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 802 (6th ed. 
2000) (“Generally speaking the courts have read Ake narrowly, and have refused to require 
appointment of an expert unless it is absolutely essential to the defense.”).  See also 
GIANNELLI, supra note 7, at ch. 4 (discussing right to defense experts). 
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Second, there should be more open discovery concerning experts in criminal 
cases.  Comprehensive reports should be required, and expert depositions, or at least 
written interrogatories, should be permitted.   
Third, the defense must have access to experts.  Attorneys cannot understand 
scientific evidence unless they have experts available to assist them in evaluating 
such evidence. 
Thank you. 
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